We investigate the ergodic secrecy capacity of a Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) wire-tap channel, where the instantaneous Channel State Information (CSI) is available at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, but not at the source. We derive the perfectsecrecy capacity under a general ergodic fading process (with a continuous probability density function) and show that a circularly symmetric Gaussian input is optimal. Our results show that even with no CSI at the transmitter, the fading is beneficial too, and that reliable communication with perfect-secrecy is still possible. When specialized to a Gaussian channel with Rayleigh fading, we further show that a circularly symmetric Gaussian input with diagonal covariance is optimal. Our results show, for instance, that equal power allocation over the transmit antennas is not generally capacity-achieving.
I. Introduction
The open nature of wireless communications has recently emerged the security issue as an essential constraint in some specific applications. Traditionally, the secrecy paradigm has been an active research topic that belongs to data-encryption activities.
Basically, the main idea behind data-encryption is that a source may communicate securely with a destination provided that they agree on a encryption key protocol and provided that a malicious eavesdropper has a limited computation capability to recover the agreed encryption key. Clearly, this notion of security has a relative sense as the robustness of a Data-Encryption Algorithm (DEA) is measured by the time and the budget that are required by a cracking machine to break this encryption key. With the increasing improvement of digital hardware and the continuous decreasing cost of digital signal processing techniques, resorting to a stricter notion of security is of crucial interest. Recently, Information theory has included the notion of security as a new constraint in order to establish the fundamental limits of secure-communications over many typical channels.
In this perspective, the wire-tap channel, in which a source communicates with a receiver through a discrete, memoryless channel (DMC) and a wire-taper observes the output of this channel via an other DMC, has been introduced by Wyner [1] . In this seminal work, it has been shown that if the capacity of the main channel is greater than the capacity of the wire-tapper one, then there exists a encoding-decoding scheme such that reliable communication with perfect-secrecy is possible (without the use of any encryption key). In a slightly similar framework, Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman have characterized the secrecy-capacity and the achievable rate-equivocation region for the Gaussian Wire-tap channel with additive noise [2] . In [3] , secure communication is settled differently: K data bits are encoded to N bits and transmitted over a noiseless DMC. The intruder is allowed to have access to an arbitrary subset of size µ < N.
Nonetheless, secure communication is again possible provided that µ < N − K. Later on, Csiszar generalized Wyner's wire-tap channel by considering a non-degraded broadcast channel with confidential messages, where a source transmits a common message to two receivers at rate R 1 along with a private message to one of these receivers at rate R 0 [4] . Therein, it has been shown that "under certain conditions" on R 0 , R 1 and the equivocation rate R e , reliable communication with perfect-secrecy is still meaningful.
When specialized to the non-degraded broadcast channel, Csiszar also established that perfect-secrecy is strictly positive unless the wire-taper's channel is "less noisy" 1 than the main channel. In a more practical purpose, secrecy-capacity-achieving codes have been proposed for some specific wire-tap channels in [6] . Several other papers have discussed practical and theoretical aspects of perfectly secure communication in cryptographic and/or information-theoretic point of views over Gaussian wire-tap, broadcast and multiple access channels, e.g., [7] - [14] .
Motivated by these positive previous results, many other authors have recently addressed the impact of fading on secure communications. Intuitively, fading generally increases the randomness of the channel input and it is therefore not surprising that fading may help improve communication security. Indeed, it has been shown in, e.g., [15] - [17] that in a quai-static fading channel and in contrast to the Gaussian channel, secure communication is possible even if the average Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of the main channel is less than that of the wire-tapper (or one of the wire-tappers in a multiple eavesdroppers case as discussed in [18] ). Moreover, if a high level of outage is to be tolerated, then the outage secrecy rate of the fading channel can even be higher than the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wire-tap channel for similar average SNR levels. The effect of fading on secure communication for single-antenna wire-tap and broadcast channels has also been studied in [19] - [21] where the secrecy-capacity along with the optimal power allocation and/or rate-adaptation strategies at the source have been derived under different Channel State Information (CSI) assumptions. The secrecycapacity of a deterministic Multiple-antenna wire-tap channel has been studied recently in [22] - [24] . The effect of multiple antennas in enhancing the security capability of a wireless link has also been addressed in [25] in terms of low probability of intercept and low probability of detection constraints. Finally, the secret diversity-multiplexing tradeoff of a multiple-antenna wire-tap channel has been investigated in [26] .
In this paper, the secrecy capacity over a general ergodic stationary fading channel is investigated. Unlike most of the contributions cited above, no instantaneous CSI is available at the source. Such an assumption is motivated by the fact that in a highmobility environment for instance, it becomes impractical to track the instantaneous channel realizations accurately. Also, the no-CSI at the source channel model may be viewed as a channel model that provides a lower bound on the performances of a channel estimation scheme, where the the main and the wire-tap channels are estimated at the transmitter. Therefore, it is of interest to analyze in such a case whether it is also possible to communicate reliably and securely, and what is the impact of multiple antennas towards this objective. We assume that both the number of channel uses per coherence period T c and the number of coherence periods L are sufficiently large to invoke the random coding and the low of large numbers arguments as it is discussed in the sequel,
• at time coherence i, the coded-block x(i) is de-multiplexed and sent through N t transmit antennas. The outputs at both the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper, at time coherence period i = 1, . . . , L, are expressed, respectively by:
where x(i) ∈ N t is the transmitted signal, and
the main channel and the wire-tap channel gains, respectively, and n m (i) ∈ N m , n e (i) ∈ N e are circularly symmetric white Gaussian noises with covariance matrices
We assume that the fading processes {H m (i)} and {H e (i)} are ergodic and stationary. The source is constrained according to a short-term average power constraint:
• an optimum decoder mapping at the legitimate receiver
• the error rate is
Throughout this paper we assume that CSI is available at the receivers. That is, the legitimate receiver knows the instantaneous main channel realization H m (i) and the eavesdropper knows the instantaneous wire-tap channel realization H e (i). No CSI is assumed at the transmitter. However, although the source does not know the instantaneous channel realizations of the main and the eavesdropper channels, it does know their statistics. Beside the fact that it includes the effect of multiple-antennas on the secrecy-capacity, the channel model described above also differs from [19] in the sense that as the instantaneous CSI of the main and the eavesdropper channels are not available at the source, then neither a rate adaptation nor a power allocation strategy can be adopted.
The level of uncertainty about the message s at the eavesdropper is measured by the equivocation rate defined by:
where y
and H (L) e are defined similarly. The higher the equivocation rate is, the smaller is the knowledge of the eavesdropper about the source.
A simple upper bound on the equivocation rate can be obtained as follows:
where (3) holds because conditioning reduces the entropy and (7) follows from the fact | S |= 2 K and thus the entropy is maximized by a uniform distribution over S. We focus on the perfect-secrecy capacity for which the upper bound (5) is achieved as L → ∞,
i.e. R e = R for a sufficiently large number of coherence periods L and a large number of channel uses per coherence period T c .
Definition 1:
A rate R is an achievable perfect-secrecy rate if for all ǫ > 0, there exists an encoder-decoder (K, L, P e ) for which
Moreover, the perfect-secrecy capacity is given by:
where R s is the set of achievable secrecy rates.
Our result is a derivation of the perfect-secrecy capacity and a characterization of the optimal input distribution for ergodic fading channels.
Theorem 1:
For the fast fading channel with ideal interleaving as defined above, the perfect-secrecy capacity is achieved when x is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian with zero-mean and covariance Q x = [xx † ] such that tr (Q x ) ≤ P. Furthermore, the capacity is given by:
where we have used the notation
for convenience.
Proof:
The proof is presented in Section III.
Theorem 1 has the following interpretation: A source that does not have the instantaneous channel realizations of both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, "acts" like there is no secrecy constraint and communicate using a Gaussian code book. I(x; y e | H e = H e ), thus the instantaneous perfect-secrecy rate is equal to zero and the transmitted power is wasted. As averaging in (7) is on a random and positive quantity and as H m and H e are independent with continuous probability density functions, the ergodic perfect-secrecy capacity is strictly positive. 2 Note that, if CSI of both the legitimate and the eavesdropper receivers was available at the source, a better strategy that would avoid this power wasting, albeit not the optimal one, would be to transmit
with an average power P, and not to transmit otherwise.
III. Proof of Theorem 1
We prove Theorem 1 as follows. First, we fix a realization of the fading process {H m (i), H e (i)} and we show that the rate
where x(i) is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian with zero-mean and covariance Q x , is achieved. Then, using the ergodic-stationarity of the fading process, we show that as L → ∞, this rate converges to
Maximizing this rate with respect to the power constraint completes the proof of the achievability part of Theorem 1. To prove the converse part of Theorem 1, we show that a code (K, L, P e ) that achieves the perfect-secrecy in the sense of Definition 1, has a rate which is upper-bounded by the right hand side (RHS) of (6) . For this purpose, we upper-bound the equivocation rate R e using series of inequalities.
A. Achievability part of Theorem 1
Let us fix a realization of the fading process {H m (i) 
, we get a lower bound on the achievable perfect-secrecy rate:
where the maximization is over all the input distributions subject to the power constraint. Now, we give the following lemma that better characterizes an optimal solution of the optimization problem (10).
Lemma 1:
Consider the optimization problem:
where A and B are fixed complex matrices; n m and n e are circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian vectors independent of x and with independent and identically distributed elements; S is a positive semidefinite matrix and µ ≥ 1. A circularly symmetric complex Gaussian x is an optimal solution.
Proof: For convenience, the proof is presented in the Appendix. 
where x G (i 0 ) is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian with zero-mean and covariance Q x such that tr (Q x ) ≤ P. Equality (12) holds because given H m (i 0 ), H e (i 0 ) and x(i 0 ), the channel outputs y m (i 0 ) and y e (i 0 ) are Gaussian with covariances I N m and I N e , respectively; equality (13) follows using Lemma 1 along with the fact that the covariance constraint subsumes the trace constraint; equality (14) is justified by the fact that since x G (i 0 ) is Gaussian, then so are y m (i 0 ) and y e (i 0 ) with covariances (
Therefore, for a large block length L and a given realization of the fading process
is achieved through the interleaved channel, with regard to the short-term power constraint. Since the right hand side (RHS) of (14) is ergodic, then we have:
is an achievable perfect-secrecy rate. Maximizing (16) with respect to the power constraint completes the proof of the achievability part of Theorem 1.
B. Converse part of Theorem 1
Let (K, L, P e ) be a code with rate R that achieves the perfect-secrecy in the sense of Definition 1. If this code is used upon the channel with input x (L) and the output
e ) and where no secrecy constraint is imposed, and if we let λ be the average error probability obtained using a maximum-likelihood decoder to the new channel, then we have:
Moreover, considering this new channel, we have that (s, y
out )) is a Markov chain. Thus, we have:
≤ Kh(P e ) + KP e log (|S| − 1) (19)
where h(λ) = −λ log λ − (1 − λ) log (1 − λ), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and where δ(P e ) = R(h(P e ) + P e log (|S| − 1)) with lim (19) follows from (17) and from the fact that h(λ) is an increasing function for small values of λ. Note that (20) holds regardless of whether the original channel is degraded or not. Now, from (2), we have:
≤ max
The steps for upper-bounding the equivocation rate are justified as follows:
• (21) follows from (20),
• (22) and (23) are standard information-theory relations,
• (24) is true because conditioning decreases the entropy,
e ) forms a Markov chain,
• (26) is justified by the memoryless character of the channel and by the fact that conditioning reduces the entropy,
• (27) is worth a detailed explanation. First, similarly to [19] and [20, Maximizing the RHS of (29) over all the input distributions, we prove (27),
• finally, (28) follows from (14) .
For L large enough (L ≫ 1), the argument of the max function in (28) converges to its mean due to the ergodicity of the fading process which results in the following upper bound on the equivocation rate
and thus the proof of the converse part of Theorem 1.
IV. The Gaussian channel with Rayleigh fading
In this section, we specialize the results established in section II to the Gaussian Channel with Rayleigh fading. That is, H m and H e have independent and identicallydistributed Gaussian entries with zero-mean and unit-variance. No instantaneous CSI is available at the transmitter, whereas the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper perfectly track their respective channels. For these specific settings, we prove the following result.
Theorem 2:
For the fast Rayleigh-fading Gaussian channel as defined above, the ergodic perfect-secrecy capacity is achieved by a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian input, with zero-mean and diagonal covariance D x such that tr (D x ) ≤ P. Furthermore, the capacity is given by:
Proof: That a circularly symmetric Gaussian input is optimal as well as the expression of the ergodic perfect-secrecy capacity Note that Theorem 2 improves the characterization of the perfect-secrecy capacityachieving input for the Rayleigh fading channel in comparison to the general ergodic stationary fading channels. Indeed, as stated by Theorem 2, independent Gaussian entries are optimal in this case and more generally, for all ergodic stationary channels such that H m U and H e U have the same distributions as H m and H e , respectively. Nevertheless, it does not fully characterize the optimal power repartition over the transmit antenna;
and unless an equal power repartition policy is adopted at the transmitter, in which case the the optimal input is fully characterized as circularly symmetric Gaussian with covariance P N t I N t , the optimal power repartition is still generally not known. Clearly, the objective function in (31) contains the difference of two concave functions (log det (·)) which is not necessarily concave and it is not straightforward to see whether this objective function is concave or not. Therefore, trying to resolve (31) analytically in its general setting is very involved and resignation to numerical solutions is seemingly required. However, although a closed form expression of the perfect-secrecy capacity is generally not easy to obtain, derivation of such an expression for some particular cases is. Below, we provide an analytical solution to the optimization problem (31) for a single-antenna transmitter. For the general case, a lower-bound on the perfect-secrecy capacity is also given.
A. Source with a single-antenna transmitter
In this subsection, we analyze the case in which the source has one antenna N t = 1, and the legitimate and the eavesdropper receivers have N m and N e antennas, respectively. An integral form expression of the perfect-secrecy capacity is easily derived in the following corollary.
Corollary 1:
For the Gaussian channel with Rayleigh fading, when the source has a single transmit antenna, the perfect-secrecy capacity is given by:
where f N (x) is the probability density function of a chi-square random variable with 2N
degrees of freedom, given by:
Proof: To obtain (32) from (31), we have used det(I + AB) = det(I + BA) along with the fact that h m 2 and h e 2 , the Frobenius norms of the actual main and the eavesdropper channels, are now chi-square distributed with 2N m and 2N e degrees of freedom, respectively.
To the best of the authors knowledge, a part from the case where N m = N e = 1 for which a closed form expression of the perfect-secrecy capacity can be obtained from (32) and is given by Corollary 2: At low and high SNR regimes, the perfect-secrecy capacity is respectively given by:
where δ(N m , N e ) and ∆(N m , N e ) are respectively given by:
] is the hypergeometric function.
In Corollary 2, δ(N m , N e ) quantify how the perfect-secrecy capacity scales at low SNR, whereas ∆(N m , N e ) represents the constant limit behavior of the secrecy capacity at high SNR. From Corollary 2, we may infer the following remarks:
• At high SNR, there is no log (P) term in (35). This implies that the degree of freedom at high SNR which is equal to min (N t , N m ) = 1 when there is no secrecy constraint, has vanished in presence of an eavesdropper. This vanishing effect of the degree of freedom, may be made more precise by defining the secrecy-penalty in terms of capacity as:
where C ns (P) is the capacity without secrecy constraint. Using (35) and (37), the secrecy-penalty at high SNR ∆ ∞ (P) may be computed and is equal to ∆ ∞ (P) = 100%.
This also suggests that, similarly to the case where there is no secrecy constraint, the gain, in terms of capacity, provided by using multiple antenna at the receiver sides, when the source has only one transmit antenna, is marginal at a high-SNR regime.
• At low-SNR regime, the plot is different. Indeed, using multiple antennas at the receiver sides seems to have more effect on the secrecy capacity since it scales linearly with P, similarly to the capacity with no secrecy constraint. Clearly, when no secrecy constraint is imposed, the capacity scales as N m log (P), whereas the secrecy capacity scales as δ(N m , N e ) log (P). Therefore, in order to quantify the performance loss in terms of capacity, it is reasonable to compute the secrecy-penalty at low SNR, ∆ 0 (P), for different antenna configurations. This can be done combining (34) and (37):
• At low-SNR regime, the secrecy-penalty is also related to the energy-efficiency defined as the energy required to communicate one data-bit reliably. To see this, let E n be the transmitted energy in Joules per information nat, then we have:
Combining (34), (38) and (39), we obtain:
which implies that to communicate one nat reliably, we need −10 log (N m ) dB, but to communicate that nat reliably and securely, an extra −10 log (1 − ∆ 0 (P)) dB is required.
B. Multiple antennas at the source
For the case where N t > 1 and N m and N e are arbitrary, as the optimal power repartition over the transmit antennas is not known, we consider equal power repartition at the transmitter (D x = P N t I N t ) to get a lower bound on the secrecy capacity. This yields the following lower bound: 
V. Numerical results
In this section, a MIMO wire-tap channel with Rayleigh fading is considered. First comes our results for a source with a single transmit antenna derived in sub-section IV-A. Figure 2 depicts the secrecy capacity versus the power constraint P for various receive antennas configurations (N m , N e ). These curves have been obtained using (33) and a numerical integration of (32). As can be seen in Fig. 2 , all curves have a horizontal slope at high SNR. This is due to the vanishing effect of the degree of freedom as discussed in sub-section IV-A. Moreover, if N m and N e are to be equal, using multiple antennas at the receiver sides inflects a performance loss in terms of secrecy capacity at high SNR, whereas it is somewhat beneficial at low SNR as predicted by (34) the secrecy capacity. However, when the eavesdropper has more antennas, the legitimate receiver is overwhelmed and the secrecy capacity drops for all SNR values.
In figure 3 , the secrecy-penalty (38) is plotted for several receive antennas configurations. As can be inferred from 3, in order to maintain the secrecy-penalty below a certain threshold, say 30 %, the legitimate receiver must have at least three times more antennas than the eavesdropper's. Figure 3 may also be used to quantify the energy efficiency of secure communication (with a single transmit antenna) at low SNR as suggested by (40). Closer to zero is ∆ 0 (P), higher is the energy efficiency.
For more than one transmit antenna, the lower bound on the secrecy capacity C lower s
given by (41) has been used and the curves shown in Fig. 4 have been obtained using the fact that when N e ≤ min (N t , N m ), the degree of freedom available in the channel at high SNR is equal to zero as was shown in [26] . In contrast, the the secrecy capacity corresponding to (N t , N m , N e ) = (2, 3, 1), manifests a logarithmical increase at high SNR, because the actual degree of freedom is now equal to one. Note also the interesting fact that that when N m = N e = 2 for instance, using 2 transmit antennas yields more capacity than using all 3 antennas, which implies that equal power allocation over the transmit antennas is not generally capacity-achieving.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we have derived the ergodic secrecy capacity for general ergodic stationary fading channels, and have shown that a circularly symmetric Gaussian input is optimal. When applied to a Gaussian channel with Rayleigh fading, we have further shown that the covariance of the optimal input may be chosen to be diagonal. For With these notations, we may write:
where (43) follows because the elements of n m are independent and because n m and x are independent. Thus, omitting the covariance constraint, the optimization problem For this purpose, we borrow some tools from [30] . By considering the linear mapping g :
and reminding that the statistical properties of the complex random vector x are determined by the joint probability density function (pdf) of its real and imaginary vector parts (when such a pdf exists), i. In order to transform the covariance constraint to the real space, we first note that since:
Cov (x) = Cov (ℜ(x)) + Cov (ℑ(x)) + j − Cov (ℜ(x), ℑ(x)) + Cov (ℜ(x), ℑ(x)) T = 2 Cov (ℜ(x)) + j Cov (ℜ(x), ℑ(x)) T ,
where ( h(x +ẑ m ) − µh(x +ẑ e ) subject to Cov (x) Ŝ ,
with all the assumptions required to apply [28, Theorem 1] verified. By that theorem, we know that a solution to (47) is a real Gaussian vector which completes the proof of Lemma 1.
